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Considering the CJEU’s judgment in the Associação Sindical dos Juìzes Portugueses, it is highly
expected that the CJEU will follow the Advocate General’s opinion in C-619/18 and,
consequently, rule that the Polish national measures lowering the retirement age of the
Supreme Court judges and granting the President of Poland the discretion to extend the
active service of a judge after his retirement age are not in compliance with the principle of
judicial independence pursuant Art. 19(1) TEU. Such an outcome would affect the current
rule of law discourse on three grounds. First of all, it might exert pressure on the Council to
finally act in respect of the Art. 7(1) TEU procedure against Poland. Secondly and more likely,
the prospect of pecuniary sanctions in light of an Art. 260 TFEU procedure would create an
incentive for Poland to (partially) redress the situation. And lastly, yet more importantly, the
effective functioning of the preliminary ruling procedure could be endangered.
The Council under pressure
A confirmed failure to fulfil the obligations under Art. 19(1) TEU by Poland will first of all
substantiate the Commission’s observations set forth in the reasoned proposal initiating
Art. 7(1) TEU against Poland. Nevertheless, the process for the establishment of this
proposal was heavily criticised by the Polish government for fragrantly violating the
principles of objectivity and national sovereignty. Surprisingly, the Polish government
recognised the competence of the CJEU pursuant Art. 19(1) TEU, preferring the legal route
over the political dialogue on the basis of Art. 7(1) TEU. Notably, this statement precedes the
Associação Sindical dos Juìzes Portugueses judgment and its ground-breaking outcome. On
the basis of this judgment, Art. 19(1) TEU serves as a verifiable criterion to challenge national
measures related to the functioning of the judiciary, in contrast to the probably anticipated
infringement procedures against Hungary (See Scheppele, Making Infringement Procedures
More Effective).
An established infringement of the principle of judicial independence, as the core element
of the rule of law, should be a sign for the Council to finally act upon its proclaimed
responsibilities under Art. 7(1) TEU, instead of its inaction in this regard and its repeated
obstruction of the Commission’s work related to rule of law enforcement up till now (See
Scheppele and Pech, Never Missing an Opportunity to Miss an Opportunity: The Council
Legal Service Opinion on the Commission’s EU budget-related rule of law mechanism). Art.
7(1) TEU provides for the Council the possibility to determine a clear risk of a serious breach
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with a four-fifths majority. Yet, not much has happened since the Commission’s initiation of
Art. 7(1) TEU against Poland on the 20  of December 2017, except for a disappointing
dialogue without tangible results. To date, the Council held in the framework of Art. 7(1) TEU
three hearings built upon a peer review exercise, during which the Commission and Poland
set forward their observations regarding the main concerns and the other Member States
raised questions. The mere conclusion of the Council was, however, to return to the
discussions during the next Council Meeting, which is, then, depending on the Commission’s
persistent incitement to have, yet, another hearing on the Polish situation. Besides this
incitement, no task is left for the Commission in the framework of Art. 7(1) TEU. Hence, the
Council should, in turn, finally take its competence under Art. 7(1) TEU seriously and move
from the preliminary stage of Art. 7(1) TEU to the determination of a clear risk of a serious
breach, which is the ultimate purpose of Art. 7(1) TEU. This entails that the Council needs to
start the voting procedure on the basis of the documentation delivered by the Commission
in the context of the EU Rule of Law Framework and the judgment. This information
provides sufficient evidence for the determination of a clear risk of a serious breach under
Art. 7(1) TEU. Attaining the required four-fifths majority pursuant Art. 7(1) TEU might be
realisable, in contrast to the determination of a serious and persistent breach, which
requires unanimity pursuant Art. 7(2) TEU. However, the political reality makes such a u vote
unattainable, since Hungary is also facing an Art. 7(1) TEU procedure . Yet, the Council
should bear in mind that the effective application of EU law is, after all, an essential
component of the rule of law.
The incentive of pecuniary sanctions
More importantly, the establishment of an infringement of Art. 19(1) TEU would mean that
the Commission has recourse to Art. 260 TFEU in case Poland fails to comply with the
judgment, entailing that the CJEU can impose pecuniary sanctions in the form of a lump
sum or a penalty payment. Especially with regard to the order of the CJEU in the Białowieża
case establishing penalty payments in case Poland did not comply with the interim
measures and Poland’s reaction as a consequence thereof, the prospect of potential
pecuniary sanctions seems to produce an incentive to adhere to the CJEU’s decision.
Moreover, the reaction of Poland on the interim measures requested by the Commission
already sheds light on the possible reaction on the definitive judgment. The Commission
seemingly learned lessons from the Commission v. Hungary case and tried to retain a status
quo in the formation of Supreme Court judges before too much damage was done. The
requested interim measures adopted by the Vice President of the CJEU in the Order of 19
October 2018 (and confirmed by the CJEU in the Order of 17 December 2018) led to the
amendment of the Supreme Court Act, reinstating the retirement age of judges at the age
of 70 years.
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The compliance with such a judgment can, however, not be seen apart from the other
pending infringement actions against Poland. Full compliance with this judgment will as
such not solve the overall rule of law crisis as it exists nowadays in Poland. Yet, partial
restoration of the rule of law backsliding, in particular with regard to the attacks on the
Supreme Court via the lowering of the retirement age and the margin of discretionary
power in hands of the President of Poland in extending the retirement age, could be
expected. Similar outcomes in the other pending infringement cases would entail
restoration of the lowering of the retirement age of ordinary courts and of the disciplinary
regime which are endangering the independence of judiciary. Although the result cannot be
overestimated, it is fair to say that the compliance with these judgments would produce
more effects than the political dialogue in the context of the EU Rule of Law Framework of
the Commission, the Rule of Law Dialogue of the Council, and the Art. 7(1) TEU procedure
have induced.
Yet, a danger for the functioning of the preliminary ruling
procedure?
Notwithstanding these potential positive effects following from the infringement procedure,
one important caveat has to be raised with regard to the relationship between the judicial
independence and the preliminary ruling procedure under Art. 267 TFEU. Indeed, the
dialogue between the national judiciary and the CJEU established in the framework of the
preliminary ruling procedure as enshrined in Art. 267(2) and (3) TFEU can only be realised in
case the court referring a preliminary question can be qualified as a court or tribunal in the
sense of Art. 267 TFEU. This entails that the court or tribunal should comply with the
criteria, amongst other things that the body is established by law, it is permanent, its
jurisdiction is compulsory, its procedure is inter partes, it applies rules of law, and – the most
essential element in this respect – that the body is independent. Moreover, the CJEU has
explicitly clarified in its order of 17 December 2019 (para. 66) that:
“The independence of national courts and tribunals is, in particular, essential to the proper working
of the judicial cooperation system embodied by the preliminary ruling mechanism under Article
267 TFEU (…) that mechanism may be activated only by a body responsible for applying EU law
which satisfies, inter alia, that criterion of independence”.
Consequently, the conclusion that the Member State has failed to fulfil its obligation under
Art. 19(1) TEU, namely failed to guarantee that its courts and tribunals meet the
requirement of effective judicial protection, the very essence of which is the principle of
judicial independence, entails that this court or tribunal is no longer independent and, thus,
can no longer be qualified as a court or tribunal in the sense of EU law in order to refer
preliminary questions under Art. 267 TFEU. This reasoning would have tremendous
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implications for the Polish Supreme Court, especially in light of the preliminary questions
posed by this court, as it would no longer be able to refer preliminary questions to the CJEU
as the highest court of the Polish judiciary.
In the end, this is exactly what the Polish government tries to achieve by adopting the new
disciplinary regime, namely avoiding the judicial interference of the CJEU in the form of
preliminary references as a consequence of the possibility for judges to be subjected to
disciplinary proceedings for the content of their judicial decisions. Paradoxically, the Polish
government is even instigating disciplinary proceedings against the judges who referred
questions on the compatibility of this disciplinary regime with EU law, confirming the
European Commission’s fear.
Such a reasoning should, however, be avoided, since the preliminary reference procedure
under Art. 267 TFEU is the cornerstone of the judicial system established on the basis of Art.
19(1) TEU to ensure the autonomy of EU law. In case it would be argued that the preliminary
questions posed by a court, targeted by the national measures eliminating its independence
and impartiality, are inadmissible for the above-mentioned reasons, this court should a
fortiori be able to use its fullest discretion to pose questions to the CJEU in order to ensure
the consistency, uniformity, effectiveness and autonomy of EU law, the core characteristics
upon which the EU is built (paras. 109-111 of opinion 1/17). Indeed, the fact that these
courts want to refer questions concerning the compatibility of the contested national
measures, contends the independence and the impartiality of that particular judge posing
questions, as it is opposing the intended pressure by the government, facing disciplinary
proceedings. Moreover, it shows the needed willingness of the judiciary of a rule of law
backsliding Member State to fight against this backslide and the remaining hope in the ‘legal
route’ of rule of law enforcement by the CJEU, when the political route has reached or is
close in nearing deadlock.
A good start is half the job
It can, therefore, be expected that a confirmed breach of the principle of judicial
independence would resort in action of Poland to (partially) restore the rule of law
backsliding. This – hopefully achieved – result should, however, not detract from the fact
that a permanent monitoring of all the Member States, comparable to the Cooperation and
Verification Mechanism for Bulgaria and Romania, should be established in order to review
the actions of the Member States in relation to the rule of law. This monitoring, firstly, needs
to lead to an objective and on evidence based alarm-system in the case of potential rule of
law breaches at the earliest stage possible and, secondly, to effective action from the EU-
institutions.
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Congrats!
You read this long post all the way down. Thanks, much obliged! Now, let me ask you
something: Do you enjoy reading Verfassungsblog? If you do, please support us so that we
can keep up our work and stay independent.
All the best, Max Steinbeis
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